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Abstract. We provide a new identification protocol and new signature schemes
based on isogeny problems. Our identification protocol relies on the hardness of
the endomorphism ring computation problem, arguably the hardest of all prob-
lems in this area, whereas the only previous scheme based on isogenies (due to
De Feo, Jao and Pluˆt) relied on potentially easier problems. The protocol makes
novel use of an algorithm of Kohel-Lauter-Petit-Tignol for the quaternion version
of the `-isogeny problem, for which we provide a more complete description and
analysis. Our new signature schemes are derived from the identification proto-
cols using the Fiat-Shamir (respectively, Unruh) transforms for classical (respec-
tively, post-quantum) security. We study their efficiency, highlighting very small
key sizes and reasonably efficient signing and verification algorithms.
1 Introduction
A recent research area is cryptosystems whose security is based on the difficulty of
finding a path in the isogeny graph of supersingular elliptic curves [6,21,14,22,8]. Un-
like other elliptic curve cryptosystems, the only known quantum algorithm for these
problems, due to Biasse-Jao-Sankar [4], has exponential complexity. Hence, additional
motivation for the study of these cryptosystems is that they are possibly suitable for
post-quantum cryptography.
A large range of cryptographic primitives can now be based on isogeny assumptions.
The work of Charles-Goren-Lauter [6] gave a collision-resistant hash function. Jao-
De Feo [21] gave a key exchange protocol, De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt [14] gave a public key
encryption scheme and an interactive identification protocol, Jao-Soukharev [22] gave
an undeniable signature, and Xi-Tian-Wang [41] gave a designated verifier signature.
In this paper we focus on identification protocols and signature schemes.
A first identification protocol based on isogeny problems was proposed by De Feo-
Jao-Pluˆt [14], as an extension of the key exchange protocol of Jao-De Feo [21]. This
scheme has the advantage of being simple to describe and easy to implement. On the
other hand, it inherits the disadvantages of [21], in particular it relies on a non-standard
isogeny problem using small isogeny degrees, reveals auxiliary points, and uses special
primes.
The fastest classical attack on this scheme has heuristic running time of O˜(p1/4) bit
operations, and the fastest quantum attack has running time of O˜(p1/6). Several recent
papers [17,32,19,29] have shown that revealing auxiliary points may be dangerous in
certain contexts. It is therefore highly advisable to build cryptographic schemes on the
most general, standard and potentially hardest isogeny problems.
Our main contribution in this paper is a new identification protocol with statistical
zero-knowledge and computational soundness based on the endomorphism ring com-
putation problem. The latter problem has been studied for some time in computational
number theory, and is equivalent to computing an isogeny between two arbitrary given
elliptic curves, without any restriction on the parameters and no extra information re-
vealed. In contrast to the problem used in De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt’s protocol, this problem
has heuristic classical complexity of O˜(p1/2) bit operations, and quantum complexity
O˜(p1/4).
Our identification protocol is very similar to the standard sigma protocol for graph
isomorphism.
The public key is a pair of elliptic curves (E0, E1) and the private key is an isogeny
φ : E0 → E1. To interactively prove knowledge of φ one chooses a random isogeny
ψ : E1 → E2 and sends E2 to the verifier. The verifier sends a bit b. If b = 0 the
prover reveals ψ. If b = 1 the prover reveals an isogeny µ : E0 → E2. In either case,
the verifier checks that the response is correct. The interaction is repeated a number
of times until the verifier is convinced that the prover knows an isogeny from E0 to
E1. However, the subtlety is that we cannot just set µ = ψ ◦ φ, as then E1 would
appear on the path in the isogeny graph fromE0 toE2 and so we would have leaked the
private key. The crucial idea is to use the algorithm of Kohel-Lauter-Petit-Tignol [26] to
produce an isogeny µ : E0 → E2 that is completely independent of φ. The mathematics
behind the algorithm of Kohel-Lauter-Petit-Tignol goes beyond what usually arises in
elliptic curve cryptography.
Our second contribution are secure digital signatures based on isogeny problems,
which we construct using generic transforms from identification protocols. We use the
well-known Fiat-Shamir transform [15] to obtain security against classical adversaries
in the random oracle model. This is not known to be secure against quantum adver-
saries4 so for post-quantum security we use another transform due to Unruh [33]. We
provide a full description of the two resulting signature schemes. Our signatures have
very small key sizes, and reasonably efficient signing and verification procedures. The
full version of the paper also contains two signature schemes based on the De Feo-Jao-
Pluˆt ID-scheme.5.
As an additional contribution, we carefully analyse the complexity of the quaternion
isogeny algorithm of Kohel-Lauter-Petit-Tignol [26] for powersmooth norms, and we
highlight a property of its output distribution (under a minor change) that had remained
4 To some extent, Fiat-Shamir signatures are in fact not believed to be secure against quantum
adversaries [33], although they can be proven to be secure under certain conditions [34] which
the schemes presented do not verify.
5 These signatures schemes were independently proposed by Yoo et al. [42]; our versions have
smaller signature sizes for the same security guarantees.
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unnoticed until now. This contribution is of independent interest, and it might be useful
for other schemes based on similar isogeny problems.
Outline. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give preliminaries on
isogeny problems and random walks in isogeny graphs, as well as security definitions
for identification protocols. In Section 3 we describe our new identification protocol
based on the endomorphism ring computation problem. In Section 4 we present our
signature schemes and summarize their main efficiency features. A full version of this
paper is available on the IACR eprint server [18].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Hard Problem Candidates Related to Isogenies
We summarize the required background on elliptic curves. For a more detailed exposi-
tion of the theory, see [31]. Let E,E′ be two elliptic curves over a finite field Fq . An
isogeny ϕ : E → E′ is a non-constant morphism from E to E′ that maps the neu-
tral element into the neutral element. The degree of an isogeny ϕ is the degree of ϕ
as a morphism. An isogeny of degree ` is called an `-isogeny. If ϕ is separable, then
degϕ = # kerϕ. If there is a separable isogeny between two curves, we say that they
are isogenous. Tate’s theorem is that two curves E,E′ over Fq are isogenous over Fq if
and only if #E(Fq) = #E′(Fq).
A separable isogeny can be identified with its kernel [40]. Given a subgroup G of
E, we can use Ve´lu’s formulae [39] to explicitly obtain an isogeny ϕ : E → E′ with
kernel G and such that E′ ∼= E/G. These formulas involve sums over points in G,
so using them is efficient as long as #G is small. Kohel [25] and Dewaghe [12] have
(independently) given formulae for the Ve´lu isogeny in terms of the coefficients of the
polynomial defining the kernel, rather than in terms of the points in the kernel. Given a
prime `, the torsion group E[`] contains exactly `+ 1 cyclic subgroups of order `, each
one corresponding to a different isogeny.
A composition of n separable isogenies of degrees `i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n gives an isogeny
of degree N =
∏
i `i with kernel a group G of order N . Conversely any isogeny whose
kernel is a group of smooth order can be decomposed as a sequence of isogenies of
small degree, hence can be computed efficiently. For any permutation σ on {1, . . . , n},
by considering appropriate subgroups of G, one can write the isogeny as a composition
of isogenies of degree `σ(i). Hence, there is no loss of generality in the protocols in our
paper of considering chains of isogenies of increasing degree.
For each isogeny ϕ : E → E′, there is a unique isogeny ϕˆ : E′ → E, which is
called the dual isogeny of ϕ, and which satisfies ϕϕˆ = ϕˆϕ = [degϕ]. If we have two
isogenies ϕ : E → E′ and ϕ′ : E′ → E such that ϕϕ′ and ϕ′ϕ are the identity in their
respective curves, we say that ϕ,ϕ′ are isomorphisms, and that E,E′ are isomorphic.
Isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over Fq can be labeled with their j-invariant [31,
III.1.4(b)]. An isogeny ϕ : E → E′ such that E = E′ is called an endomorphism.
The set of endomorphisms of an elliptic curve, denoted by End(E), has a ring structure
with the operations point-wise addition and function composition.
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Elliptic curves can be classified according to their endomorphism ring. Over the
algebraic closure of the field, End(E) is either an order in a quadratic imaginary field
or a maximal order in a quaternion algebra. In the first case, we say that the curve
is ordinary, whereas in the second case we say that the curve is supersingular. The
endomorphism ring of a supersingular curve over a field of characteristic p is a maximal
order O in the quaternion algebra Bp,∞ ramified at p and∞.
In the case of supersingular elliptic curves, there is always a curve in the isomor-
phism class defined over Fp2 , and the j-invariant of the class is also an element of Fp2 .
A theorem by Deuring [11] gives an equivalence of categories between the j-invariants
of supersingular elliptic curves over Fp2 up to Galois conjugacy in Fp2 , and the max-
imal orders in the quaternion algebra Bp,∞ up to the equivalence relation given by
O ∼ O′ if and only if O = α−1O′α for some α ∈ B∗p,∞. Specifically, the equivalence
of categories associates to every j-invariant a maximal order that is isomorphic to the
endomorphism ring of any curve with that j-invariant. Furthermore, if E0 is an elliptic
curve with End(E0) = O0, there is a one-to-one correspondence (which we call the
Deuring correspondence) between isogenies ψ : E0 → E and left O0-ideals I . More
details on the Deuring correspondence can be found in Chapter 41 of [37].
We now present some hard problem candidates related to supersingular elliptic
curves, and discuss the related algebraic problems in the light of the Deuring corre-
spondence.
Problem 1 Let p, ` be distinct prime numbers. Let E,E′ be two supersingular elliptic
curves over Fp2 with #E(Fp2) = #E′(Fp2) = (p+ 1)2, chosen uniformly at random.
Find k ∈ N and an isogeny of degree `k from E to E′.
Problem 2 Let p, ` be distinct prime numbers. Let E be a supersingular elliptic curve
over Fp2 , chosen uniformly at random. Find k1, k2 ∈ N, a supersingular elliptic curve
E′ over Fp2 , and two distinct isogenies of degrees `k1 and `k2 , respectively, from E to
E′.
The hardness assumption of both problems has been used in [6] to prove preimage
and collision-resistance of a proposed hash function. Variants of the first problem, in
which some extra information is provided, were used by De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt [14] to build
an identification scheme, a key exchange protocol and a public-key encryption scheme.
More precisely, the identification scheme in [14] relies on Problems 3 and 4 below
(which De Feo, Jao and Pluˆt call the Computational Supersingular Isogeny and Deci-
sional Supersingular Product problems). In order to state them we need to introduce
some notation. Let p be a prime of the form `e11 `
e2
2 · f ± 1, and let E be a supersingu-
lar elliptic curve over Fp2 . Let {R1, S1} and {R2, S2} be bases for E[`e11 ] and E[`e22 ],
respectively.
Problem 3 (Computational Supersingular Isogeny) Let φ1 : E → E′ be an isogeny
with kernel 〈[m1]R1 + [n1]S1〉, where m1, n1 are chosen uniformly at random from
Z/`e11 Z, and not both divisible by `1. Given E′ and the values φ1(R2), φ1(S2), find a
generator of 〈[m1]R1 + [n1]S1〉.
The fastest known algorithms for this problem use a meet-in-the-middle argument.
The classical and quantum algorithm have heuristic running time respectively of O˜(`e1/21 )
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and O˜(`e1/31 ) bit operations, which is respectively O˜(p
1/4) and O˜(p1/6) in the context
of De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt [14].
Problem 4 (Decisional Supersingular Product) Let E,E′ be supersingular elliptic
curves over Fp2 such that there exists an isogeny φ : E → E′ of degree `e11 . Fix
generators R2, S2 ∈ E[`e22 ] and suppose φ(R2) and φ(S2) are given. Consider the two
distributions of pairs (E2, E′2) as follows:
– (E2, E′2) such that there is a cyclic group G ⊆ E[`e22 ] of order `e22 and E2 ∼= E/G
and E′2 ∼= E′/φ(G).
– (E2, E′2) where E2 is chosen at random among the curves having the same cardi-
nality as E0, and φ′ : E2 → E′2 is a random `e11 -isogeny.
The problem is, given (E,E′) and the auxiliary points (R2, S2, φ(R2), φ(S2)), plus a
pair (E2, E′2), to determine from which distribution the pair is sampled.
We stress that Problems 3 and 4 are potentially easier than Problems 1 and 2 be-
cause special primes are used and extra points are revealed. Furthermore, it is shown in
Section 4 of [17] that if End(E) is known and one can find any isogeny from E to E′
then one can compute the specific isogeny of degree `e11 . The following problem, on the
other hand, offers better foundations for cryptography based on supersingular isogeny
problems.
Problem 5 Let p be a prime number. Let E be a supersingular elliptic curve over Fp2 ,
chosen uniformly at random. Determine the endomorphism ring of E.
Note that it is essential that the curve is chosen randomly in this problem, as for
special curves the endomorphism ring is easy to compute. Essentially, Problem 5 is
the same as explicitly computing the forward direction of Deuring’s correspondence.
This problem was studied by Kohel in [25], in which an algorithm to solve it was ob-
tained, but with expected running time O˜(p). It was later improved by Galbraith to
O˜(p
1
2 ), under heuristic assumptions [16]. Interestingly, the best quantum algorithm for
this problem runs in time O˜(p
1
4 ), only providing a quadratic speedup over classical al-
gorithms [4]. This has largely motivated the use of supersingular isogeny problems in
cryptography.
Problem 6 Let p be a prime number. Let E,E′ be supersingular elliptic curves over
Fp2 , chosen uniformly at random.6 Find an isogeny E → E′.
Heuristically, if we can solve Problem 1 or Problem 6, then we can solve Problem 5.
To compute an endomorphism of E, we take two random walks φ1 : E → E1 and
φ2 : E → E2, and solve Problem 6 on the pair E1, E2, obtaining an isogeny ψ : E1 →
E2. Then the composition φˆ2ψφ1 is an endomorphism of E. Repeating the process,
it is easy to find four endomorphisms that are linearly independent, thus generating a
subring of End(E), and this subring is likely to be of small index so that the full ring
can be recovered.
6 The special case E′ = E occurs with negligible probability so it can be ignored.
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For the converse, suppose that we can compute the endomorphism rings of both E
and E′. The strategy is to compute a module I that is a left ideal of End(E) and a right
ideal of End(E′) of appropriate norm, and to translate it back to the geometric setting
to obtain an isogeny. This approach motivated the quaternion `-isogeny algorithm of
Kohel-Lauter-Petit-Tignol [26,28], which solves the following problem:
Problem 7 Let p, ` be distinct prime numbers. Let O0,O1 be two maximal orders in
Bp,∞, chosen uniformly at random. Find k ∈ N and an ideal I of norm `k such that I
is a left O0-ideal and its right order is isomorphic to O1.





i where the `i are distinct primes and `
ei
i ≤ B) for B ≈ 72 log p and
usingO(log p) different primes, instead of ideals of norm a power of `. We will use that
version in our signature scheme.
For completeness we mention that ordinary curve versions of Problems 1 and 5 are
not known to be equivalent, and in fact there is a subexponential algorithm for comput-
ing the endomorphism ring of ordinary curves [5], whereas the best classical algorithm
known for computing isogenies is still exponential. There is, however, a subexponen-
tial quantum algorithm for computing an isogeny between ordinary curves [7], which is
why the main interest in cryptography is the supersingular case.
2.2 Random Walks in Isogeny Graphs
Let p ≥ 5 be a prime number. There are Np := b p12c + p supersingular j-invariants
in characteristic p, with p = 0, 1, 1, 2 when p = 1, 5, 7, 11 mod 12 respectively. For
any prime ` 6= p, one can construct a so-called isogeny graph, where each vertex is
associated to a supersingular j-invariant, and an edge between two vertices is associated
to a degree ` isogeny between the corresponding vertices.
Isogeny graphs are regular7 with regularity degree ` + 1; they are undirected since
to any isogeny from j1 to j2 corresponds a dual isogeny from j2 to j1. Isogeny graphs
are also very good expander graphs [20]; in fact they are optimal expander graphs in
the following sense:
Definition 1 (Ramanujan graph). Let G be a k-regular graph, and let k, λ2, · · · , λr
be the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix sorted by decreasing order of the absolute




This is optimal by the Alon-Boppana bound: given a family {GN} of k-regular graphs
as above, and denoting by λ2,N the corresponding second eigenvalue of each graphGN ,
we have lim infN→∞ λ2,N ≥ 2
√
k − 1. The Ramanujan property of isogeny graphs
follows from the Weil conjectures proved by Deligne [30,10].
Let p and ` be as above, and let j be a supersingular invariant in characteristic p.
We define a random step of degree ` from j as the process of randomly and uniformly
7 One needs to pay close attention to the cases j = 0 and j = 1728 when counting isogenies,
but this has no effect on our general schemes.
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choosing a neighbour of j in the `-isogeny graph, and returning that vertex. For a com-
posite degree n =
∏
i `i, we define a random walk of degree n from j0 as a sequence of
j-invariants ji such that ji is a random step of degree `i from ji−1. We do not require
the primes `i to be distinct.
The output of random walks in expander graphs converge quickly to a uniform
distribution. In our signature scheme we will be using random walks ofB-powersmooth




i , with all prime powers `
ei
i smaller than some bound B,
with B as small as possible. To analyse the ouptut distribution of these walks we will
use the following generalization8 of classical random walk theorems [20]:
Theorem 1 (Random walk theorem). Let p be a prime number, and let j0 be a su-
persingular invariant in characteristic p. Let j be the final j-invariant reached by a














PROOF: Let vtj be the probability that the outcome of the first t random steps is a given
vertex j, and let vt = (vtj)j be vectors encoding these probabilities. Let v0 correspond
to an initial state of the walk at j0 (so that v0j0 = 1 and v0j = 0 for all i 6= j0). Let
A`i be the adjacency matrix of the `i-isogeny graph. Its largest eigenvalue is k. By the
Ramanujan property the second largest eigenvalue is smaller than k in absolute value,
so the eigenspace associated to λ1 = k is of dimension 1 and generated by the vector
u := (N−1p )j corresponding to the uniform distribution. Let λ2i be the second largest
eigenvalue of A`i in absolute value.
If step t is of degree `i we have vt = 1kA`ivt−1. Moreover we have ||vt − u||2 ≤
1
kλ2i||vt−1 − u||2 since the eigenspace associated to k is of dimension 1. Iterating on
all steps we deduce
||vt − u||2 ≤
∏
i








2 ≤ 1− 2Np + 2N2p < 1. Finally we have∣∣∣∣Pr[j = j˜]− 1Np












where we have used the Ramanujan property to bound the eigenvalues. 
In our security proof we will want the right-hand term to be smaller than (p1+)−1
for an arbitrary positive constant , and at the same time we will want the powersmooth
bound B to be as small as possible. The following lemma shows that taking B ≈
2(1 + ) log p suffices asymptotically.
8 Random walks theorems are usually stated for a single graph whereas our walks will switch
from one graph to another, all with the same vertex set but different edges.
7
Lemma 1. Let  > 0. There is a function cp = c(p) such that limp→∞ cp = 2(1 + ),
















































































if B is large enough. Taking B = c log(p) where c = 2(1 + ) gives 12B = (1 +
) log p = log(p1+) which proves the lemma. 
2.3 Identification Schemes
In this section we recall the standard cryptographic notions of identification schemes.
A good general reference is Chapter 8 of Katz [23]. A sigma-protocol is a three-
move proof of knowledge of a relation. The notions of honest verifier zero-knowledge
(HVZK) and 2-special soundness are standard and due to lack of space we do not recall
them. In the special case of “hard relations” (see Definition 3 below), one can interpret
a sigma-protocol as a public key identification scheme. Good general references are the
lecture notes of Damga˚rd [9] and Venturi [35]. All algorithms below are probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) unless otherwise stated.
An identification scheme is an interactive protocol between two parties (a Prover
and a Verifier), where the Prover aims to convince the Verifier that it knows some secret
key without revealing anything about it. This is achieved by the Prover first committing
to some value, then the Verifier sending a challenge, and finally the Prover providing
some answer in accordance to the commitment, the challenge and the secret. We use
the terminology and notation of Abdalla-An-Bellare-Namprempre [1] (also see Bellare-
Poettering-Stebila [3]). We also introduce a notion of “recoverability” which is implicit
in the Schnorr signature scheme and seems to be folklore in the field.
Definition 2. A canonical identification scheme is ID = (K,P,V, c) where: K is a
PPT algorithm (key generation) that on input a security parameter λ outputs a pair
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(PK, SK); P is a PPT algorithm taking input SK and outputting a message; c ≥ 1
is the (integer) bitlength of the challenge (a function of the security parameter λ); V
is a deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm that takes as input PK and a
transcript and outputs 0 or 1. A transcript of an honest execution of the scheme ID is
the sequence: CMT ← P(PK, SK), CH ← {0, 1}c, RSP ← P(PK, SK, CMT, CH). On an
honest execution we require that V(PK, CMT, CH, RSP) = 1.
An impersonator for ID is an algorithm I that plays the following game: I takes
as input a public key PK and a set of transcripts of honest executions of the scheme
ID; I outputs CMT, receives CH ← {0, 1}c and outputs RSP. We say that I wins if
V(PK, CMT, CH, RSP) = 1. The advantage of I is |Pr(I wins) − 12c |. We say that ID
is secure against impersonation under passive attacks if the advantage is negligible for
all PPT adversaries.
An ID-scheme ID is non-trivial if c ≥ λ.
An ID-scheme is recoverable if there is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm
Rec such that for any transcript (CMT, CH, RSP) of an honest execution we have
Rec(PK, CH, RSP) = CMT.
One can transform any 2-special sound ID scheme into a non-trivial scheme by
running t sessions in parallel, and this is secure for classical adversaries (see Section 8.3
of [23]). We will not need this result in the quantum case. One first generates CMTi ←
P(PK, SK) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. One then samples CH ← {0, 1}ct and parses it as CHi ∈
{0, 1}c for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Finally one computes RSPi ← P (PK, SK, CMTi, CHi). We define
V(PK, CMT1, · · · , CMTt, CH, RSP1, · · · , RSPt) = 1
if and only if V(PK, CMTi, CHi, RSPi) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. The successful cheating
probability is then improved to 1/2ct, which is non-trivial when t ≥ λ/c.
An ID-scheme is a special case of a sigma-protocol with respect to the relation
defined by the instance generator K as (PK, SK) ← K, where we think of SK as a
witness for PK. More generally, any sigma-protocol for a relation of a certain type can
be turned into an identification scheme.
Definition 3. (Definition 6 of [35]; Section 6 of [9]; Definition 15 of [33], where it is
called “hard instance generator”) A hard relationR on Y ×X is one where there exists
a PPT algorithm K that outputs pairs (y, x) ∈ Y ×X such that R(y, x) = 1, but for
all PPT adversaries A
Pr[(y, x)← K(1λ);x′ ← A(y) : R(y, x′) = 1] ≤ negl(λ).
The following result is essentially due to Feige, Fiat and Shamir [13] and has be-
come folklore in this generality. For the proof see Theorem 5 of [35].
Theorem 2. Let R be a hard relation with generator K and let (P,V) be the prover
and verifier in a sigma-protocol for R with c-bit challenges for some integer c ≥ 1.
Suppose the sigma-protocol is complete, 2-special sound, and honest verifier zero-
knowledge. Then (K,P,V, c) is a canonical identification scheme that is secure against
impersonation under (classical) passive attacks.
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There are standard constructions to construct signature schemes from identification
protocols. Due to lack of space we refer to Abdalla-An-Bellare-Namprempre [1] (also
see Bellare-Poettering-Stebila [3]). As discussed in the full version of the paper, our
ID-schemes are recoverable, and this allows us to reduce the signature size compared
with general constructions.
3 New Identification Protocol based Endomorphism Ring
Computation
We now present our main result. The main advantage of our identification protocol
compared with De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt’s one is that security is based on the general problem
of computing the endomorphism ring of a supersingular elliptic curve, or equivalently
on computing an isogeny between two supersingular curves. In particular, the prime has
no special property and no auxiliary points are revealed.
3.1 High Level Description
Our identification protocol is similar to the graph isomorphism zero-knowledge proto-
col, in which one reveals one of two graph isomorphisms, but never enough information
to deduce the secret isomorphism.
As recalled in Section 2.1, although it is believed that computing endomorphism
rings of supersingular elliptic curves is a hard computational problem in general, there
are some particular curves for which it is easy. The following construction is explained
in Lemma 2 of [26]. We choose E0 : y2 = x3 + Ax over a field Fp2 where p ≡ 3
(mod 4) and #E0(Fp2) = (p + 1)2. We have j(E0) = 1728. When p = 3 mod
4, the quaternion algebra Bp,∞ ramified at p and ∞ can be canonically represented
as Q〈i, j〉 = Q + Qi + Qj + Qk, where i2 = −1, j2 = −p and k := ij = −ji.
The endomorphism ring of E0 is isomorphic to the maximal order O0 with Z-basis
{1, i, 1+k2 , i+j2 }. Indeed, there is an isomorphism of quaternion algebras θ : Bp,∞ →
End(E0) ⊗ Q sending (1, i, j,k) to (1, φ, pi, piφ) where pi : (x, y) → (xp, yp) is the
Frobenius endomorphism, and φ : (x, y)→ (−x, ιy) with ι2 = −1.
To generate the public and private keys, we take a random isogeny (walk in the
graph) ϕ : E0 → E1 and, using this knowledge, compute End(E1). The public in-
formation is E1. The secret is End(E1), or equivalently a path from E0 to E1. Under
the assumption that computing the endomorphism ring is hard, the secret key cannot be
computed from the public key only.
Our scheme will require three algorithms, that are explained in detail in later sec-
tions.
Translate isogeny path to ideal: Given E0,O0 = End(E0) and a chain of isogenies
from E0 to E1, to computeO1 = End(E1) and a leftO0-ideal I whose right order
is O1.
Find new path: Given a left O0-ideal I corresponding to an isogeny E0 → E2, to
produce a new left O0-ideal J corresponding to an “independent” isogeny E0 →
E2 of powersmooth degree.
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Translate ideal to isogeny path: Given E0,O0, E2, I such that I is a left O0-ideal
whose right order is isomorphic to End(E2), to compute a sequence of prime de-
gree isogenies giving the path from E0 to E2.
Figure 1 gives the interaction between the prover and the verifier. We define L to be
the product of all prime powers `e such that `e ≤ B = 2(1+) log p for an arbitrary  >





where `eii ≤ B < `ei+1i . Note that r ≈ B/ log(B) and so L ≈ p2(1+).
One can see that Figure 1 gives a canonical, recoverable identification protocol, but
it is not non-trivial as the challenge is only one bit.
1. The public key is a pair (E0, E1) and the private key is an isogeny ϕ : E0 → E1.
2. The prover performs a random walk starting from E1 of degree L in the graph, obtaining a
curve E2 and an isogeny ψ : E1 → E2, and reveals E2 to the verifier.
3. The verifier challenges the prover with a random bit b← {0, 1}.
4. If b = 0, the prover sends ψ to the verifier.
If b = 1, the prover does the following:
– Compute End(E2) and translate the isogeny path between E0 and E2 into a corre-
sponding ideal I giving the path in the quaternion algebra.
– Use the Find new path algorithm to compute an “independent” path between End(E0)
and End(E2) in the quaternion algebra, represented by an ideal J .
– Translate the ideal J to an isogeny path η from E0 to E2.
– Return η to the verifier.
5. The verifier accepts the proof if the answer to the challenge is indeed an isogeny between
E1 and E2 or between E0 and E2, respectively.
Fig. 1. New Identification Scheme






The two translation algorithms mentioned above in the b = 1 case will be described
in Section 3.4. They rely on the fact that End(E0) is known. The algorithms are ef-
ficient when the degree of the random walk is powersmooth, and for this reason all
isogenies in our protocols will be of powersmooth degree. The powersmooth version
of the quaternion isogeny algorithm of Kohel-Lauter-Petit-Tignol will be described and
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analysed in Section 3.3. The random walks are taken of sufficiently large degree such
that their output has close to uniform distribution, by Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.
We repeat the process to reduce the cheating probability. The computational hard-
ness of Problem 5 remains essentially the same if the curves are chosen according to a
distribution that is close to uniform. We can then prove:
Theorem 3. Let λ be a security parameter and t ≥ λ. If Problem 6 is computationally
hard, then the identification scheme obtained from t parallel executions of the protocol
in Figure 1 is a non-trivial, recoverable canonical identification scheme that is secure
against impersonation under (classical) passive attacks.
The advantage of this protocol over De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt’s protocol is that it relies on a
more standard and potentially harder computational problem. In the rest of this section
we first give a proof of Theorem 3, then we provide details of the algorithms involved
in our scheme.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 3
We shall prove that the sigma protocol in Figure 1 is complete, 2-special sound and
honest verifier zero-knowledge. It follows that t parallel executions of the protocol is
non-trivial as well as being 2-special sound and HVZK. The theorem will then follow
from Theorem 2 and Problem 6 (which implies that the relation being proved is a hard
relation).
Completeness. Let ϕ be an isogeny between E0 and E1 ofB-powersmooth degree,
for B = O(log p). If the challenge received is b = 0, it is clear that the prover knows
a valid isogeny ψ : E1 → E2, so the verifier accepts the proof. If b = 1, the prover
follows the procedure described above and the verifier accepts. In the next subsections
we will show that this procedure is polynomial time.
2-special soundness. Let (E0, E1) be a public key for the scheme. Suppose we are
given transcripts (CMT, {CH1, CH2}, {RSP1, RSP2}) for the single-bit scheme such that
V(PK, CMT, CHi, RSPi) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Let E2 = CMT. Since CH1 6= CH2 the
responses RSP1 and RSP2 therefore give two isogenies ψ : E1 → E2, η : E0 → E2.
Given these two valid answers an extraction algorithm can compute an isogeny φ :
E0 → E1 as φ = ψˆ ◦ η, where ψˆ is the dual isogeny of ψ. The extractor outputs φ,






Honest verifier zero-knowledge. We shall prove that there exists a probabilistic
polynomial time simulator S that outputs transcripts indistinguishable from transcripts
of interactions with an honest verifier, in the sense that the two distributions are statisti-
cally close. Note thatO0 = End(E0) is public information so is known to the simulator.
The simulator starts by taking a random coin b← {0, 1}.
– If b = 0, take a random walk from E1 of powersmooth degree L, as in the real
protocol, obtaining a curveE2 and an isogeny ψ : E1 → E2. The simulator outputs




In this case, it is clear that the distributions of every element in the transcript are
the same as in the real interaction, as they are generated in the same way. This is
possible because, when b = 0, the secret is not required for the prover to answer
the challenge.
– If b = 1, take a random walk from E0 of powersmooth degree L to obtain a curve
E2 and an isogeny µ : E0 → E2, then proceed as in Step 3 of Figure 1 to produce





The reason to output η instead of µ is to ensure that the transcript distributions are
indistinguishable from the distributions in the real scheme.
We first study the distribution of E2 up to isomorphism. Let Xr be the output of the
random walk from E1 to produce j(E2) in the real interaction, and let Xs be the output
of the random walk from E0 to produce j(E2) in the simulation.
Let G be the set of all supersingular j-invariants, namely the vertex set of the isogeny
graph. Note that #G = Np ≈ p/12. By Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, since the isogeny
walks have degree L, we have, for any j ∈ G∣∣∣∣Pr(Xr = j)− 1Np
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1p1+ ,
∣∣∣∣Pr(Xs = j)− 1Np




|Pr(Xr = j)− Pr(Xs = j)| ≤ Np ·max
i











which is a negligible function of λ for any constant  > 0. In other words, the statis-
tical distance, between the distribution of j(E2) in the real signing algorithm and the
simulation, is negligible. Now, since η is produced in the same way from E0 and E2 in
the simulation and in the real protocol execution, we have that the statistical distance
between the distributions of η is also negligible. This follows from Lemma 2 in Sec-
tion 3.3, which states that the output of the quaternion path algorithm does not depend
on the input ideal, only on its ideal class.
3.3 Quaternion Isogeny Path Algorithm
In this section we sketch the quaternion isogeny algorithm from Kohel-Lauter-Petit-
Tignol [26] and we evaluate its complexity when p = 3 mod 4. (The original paper
does not give a precise complecity analysis; it is only claimed that the algorithm runs
in heuristic probabilistic polynomial time.) This is the algorithm used for the Find new
path procedure in the identification scheme.
The algorithm takes as input two maximal orders O,O′ in the quaternion algebra
Bp,∞, and it returns a sequence of left O-ideals I0 = O ⊃ I1 ⊃ . . . ⊃ Ie such that the
right order of Ie is in the same equivalence class as O′. In addition, the output is such
that the index of Ii+1 in Ii is a small prime for all i. The paper [26] focusses on the
case where the norm of Ie is `e for some integer e, but it mentions that the algorithm
can be extended to the case of powersmooth norms. We will only describe and use
the powersmooth version. In our application there are some efficiency advantages from
using isogenies whose degree is a product of small powers of distinct primes, rather
than a large power of a small prime.
Note that the ideals returned by the quaternion isogeny path algorithm (or equiva-
lently the right orders of these ideals) correspond to vertices of the path in the quaternion
algebra graph, and to a sequence of j-invariants by Deuring’s correspondence. In the
next subsection we will describe how to make this correspondence explicit; here we
focus on the quaternion algorithm itself.
An important feature of the algorithm is that paths between two arbitrary maximal
orders O and O′ are always constructed as a concatenation of two paths from each
maximal order to a special maximal order. As mentioned above, in our protocol and the
discussion below we fix O0 = 〈1, i, 1+k2 , i+j2 〉 where i2 = −1 and j2 = −p. General
references for maximal orders and ideals in quaternion algebras are [36,37].
We focus on the case where O = O0, and assume that instead of a second maximal
O′ we are given the corresponding left O0-ideal I as input (the two variants of the
problem are equivalent). This will be sufficient for our use of the algorithm. We assume
that I is given by a Z basis of elements in O0. Denote by n(α) and n(I) the norm
of an element or ideal respectively. The equivalence class of maximal orders defines
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an equivalence class of O0-ideals, where two ideals I and J are in the same class if
and only if I = Jq with q ∈ B∗p,∞. Therefore our goal is, given a left O0-ideal I ,
to compute another left O0-ideal J with powersmooth norm in the same ideal class.
Further, in order to be able to later apply Algorithm 2, we require the norm of I to be
odd (but the Find new path algorithm also allows to find even norm ideals if desired).
Without loss of generality we assume there is no integer s > 1 such that I ⊂ sO0, and
that I 6= O0. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Compute an element δ ∈ I and an ideal I ′ = Iδ¯/n(I) of prime norm N .
2. Find β ∈ I ′ with norm NS where S is powersmooth and odd.
3. Output J = I ′β¯/N .
Steps 1 and 3 of this algorithm rely on the following simple result [26, Lemma 5]:
if I is a left O-ideal of reduced norm N and α is an element of I , then Iα¯/N is a left
O-ideal of norm n(α)/N . Clearly, I and J are in the same equivalence class.
To compute δ in Step 1, first a Minkowski-reduced basis {α1, α2, α3, α4} of I is
computed. To obtain Lemma 2 below we make sure that the Minkowski basis is uni-
formly randomly chosen among all such bases9. Then random elements δ =
∑
i xiαi
are generated with integers xi in an interval [−m,m], wherem is determined later, until
the norm of δ is equal to n(I) times a prime. A probable prime suffices in this context
(actually Step 1 is not strictly needed but aims to simplify Step 2), so we can use the
Miller-Rabin test to discard composite numbers with a large probability.
Step 2 is the core of the algorithm and actually consists of the following substeps:
2a. Find α such that I ′ = O0N +O0α.
2b. Find β1 ∈ O0 with odd powersmooth norm NS1.
2c. Find β2 ∈ Zj + Zk such that α = β1β2 mod NO0.
2d. Find β′2 ∈ O0 with odd powersmooth norm S2 and λ ∈ Z∗N such that β′2 =
λβ2 mod NO0.
2e. Set β = β1β′2.
In Step 2a we need α ∈ I ′ such that gcd(n(α), N2) = N . This is easily achieved by
taking α as a random small linear combination of a Minkowski basis, until the condition
is met. Note that if α ∈ I ′ is such that gcd(n(α), N2) = N then J := O0N+O0α ⊆ I ′
and J 6= O0N . Since the norm of O0N is N2 and N is prime it follows that the norm
of J is N and so J = I ′.
In Step 2b the algorithm actually searches for β1 = a+bi+cj+dk. A large enough
powersmooth number S1 is fixed a priori, then the algorithm generates small random
values of c, d until the norm equation a2+b2 = S1−p(c2+d2) can be solved efficiently
using Cornacchia’s algorithm (for example, until the right hand side is a prime equal to
1 modulo 4).
Step 2c is just linear algebra moduloN . As argued in [26] it has a negligible chance
of failure, in which case one can just go back to Step 2b.
In Step 2d the algorithm a priori fixes S2 large enough, then searches for integers
a, b, c, d, λ with λ /∈ NZ such that N2(a2 + b2) + p ((λC + cN)2 + (λD + dN)2) =
S2 where we have β2 = Cj +Dk. If necessary S2 is multiplied by a small prime such
9 In [26] an arbitrary Minkowski basis was chosen.
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that p(C2 +D2)S2 is a square moduloN , after which the equation is solved moduloN ,
leading to two solutions for λ. An arbitrary solution is chosen, and then looking at the
equation modulo N2 leads to a linear space of solutions for (c, d) ∈ ZN . The algorithm
chooses random solutions until the equation




(λC + cN)2 + (λD + dN)2
))
/N2
can be efficiently solved with Cornacchia’s algorithm.
The overall algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. We now prove two lemmas on
this algorithm. The first lemma shows that the output of this algorithm only depends on
the ideal class of I but not on I itself. This is important in our identification protocol, as
otherwise part of the secret isogenyϕ could potentially be recovered from η. The second
lemma gives a precise complexity analysis of the algorithm, where [26] only showed
probabilistic polynomial time complexity. Both lemmas are of independent interest.
Lemma 2. The output distribution of the quaternion isogeny path algorithm only de-
pends on the equivalence class of its input. (In particular, the output distribution does
not depend on the particular ideal class representative chosen for this input.)
PROOF: Let I1 and I2 be two leftO0-ideals in the same equivalence class, namely there
exists q ∈ B∗p,∞ such that I2 = I1q. We show that the distribution of the ideal I ′
computed in Step 1 of the algorithm is identical for I1 and I2. As the inputs are not
used anymore in the remaining of the algorithm this will prove the lemma.
In the first step the algorithm computes a Minkowski basis of its input, uniformly
chosen among all possible Minkowski bases. Let B1 = {α11, α12, α13, α14} be a
Minkowski basis of I1. Then by multiplicativity of the norm we have that B2 = {α11q,
α12q, α13q, α14q} is a Minkowski basis of I2. The algorithm then computes random
elements δ =
∑
i xiαi for integers xi in an interval [−m,m]. Clearly, for any el-
ement δ1 computed when the input is I1, there corresponds an element δ2 = δ1q
computed when the input is I2. This is repeated until the norm of δ is a prime times
n(I). As n(I2) = n(I1)n(q) the stopping condition is equivalent for both. Finally,






. This shows that the prime norm ideal computed in Step 1
only depends on the equivalence class of the input. 
The expected running time given in the following lemma relies on several heuristics
related to the factorization of numbers generated following certain distributions. Intu-
itively all these heuristics say that asymptotically those numbers behave in the same
way as random numbers of the same size.





2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 forms a Z-basis for I . If logX = O(log p) then
Algorithm 1 heuristically runs in time O˜(log3 p), and produces an output of norm S
with log(S) ≈ 72 log(p) which is ( 72 + o(1)) log p-powersmooth.
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Algorithm 1 Find new path algorithm
Input: O0 = 〈1, i, 1+k2 , i+j2 〉, I a left O0-ideal.
Output: J a left O0-ideal of powersmooth norm such that I = Jq for some q ∈ Bp,∞.
1: {α1, α2, α3, α4}Minkowski-reduced basis of I .
2: αi ← {±αi} for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
3: loop
4: {x1, x2, x3, x4} ← [−m,m]4. Start with m = dlog pe and do exhaustive




6: if N := n(δ)/n(I) is prime then return N, I ′ := Iδ/n(I)
7: Set an a priori powersmooth bound s = 7
2
log p, and odd integers S1, S2 with S1 > p log p,
S2 > p
3 log p and s-powersmooth product S1S2.
8: Choose α ∈ I such that gcd(n(α), N2) = N , so that I ′ = O0N +O0α.
9: while a, b are not found do
10: c, d← [−m,m]2, for m = b√NS1/2pc. Increase S1 and s if necessary.
11: a, b ← Solution of a2 + b2 = NS1 − p(c2 + d2) (solve using Cornacchia’s
algorithm).
12: β1 = a+ bi+ cj+ dk
13: Set β2 as a solution of α = β1β2 mod NO0 with β2 ∈ Zj+ Zk.




= 1, and set S2 = S2r. Update s accordingly.
15: λ← Solution of pλ2(C2 +D2) = S2 mod N .
16: while a, b are not found do
17: c, d← Solution of pλ2(C2 +D2) + 2pλN(Cc+Dd) = S2 mod N2.
18: a, b ← Solution of a2 + b2 = (S2 − p2 ((λC + cN)2 + (λD + dN)2)) /N2
(solve using Cornacchia’s algorithm). Increase S2 and s if necessary.
19: β′2 = a+ bi+ cj+ dk
20: J = I ′β1β′2/N
PROOF: The Minkowski basis can be computed in O(log2X), for example using
the algorithm of [27].
For generic ideals the reduced norms of all Minkowski basis elements10 are in
O(
√
p) (see [26, Section 3.1]). In the first loop we initially set m = dlog pe. Assum-
ing heuristically that the numbers N generated behave like random numbers we expect
the box to produce some prime number. The resulting N will be in O˜(
√
p). For some
non generic ideals the Minkowski basis may contain two pairs of elements with norms
respectively significantly smaller or larger than O(
√
p); in that case we can expect to
finish the loop for smaller values of m by setting x3 = x4 = 0, and to obtain some N
of a smaller size.
Rabin’s pseudo-primality test performs a single modular exponentiation (modulo
a number of size O˜(
√
p)), and it is passed by composite numbers with a probability
at most 1/4. The test can be repeated r times to decrease this probability to 1/4r.
Assuming heuristically that the numbers tested behave like random numbers the test
10 The reduced norm of an ideal element is the norm of this element divided by the norm of the
ideal.
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will only be repeated a significant amount of times on actual prime numbers, so in total
it will be repeated O(log p) times. This leads to a total complexity of O˜(log3 p) bit
operations for the first loop using fast (quasi-linear) modular multiplication.
The other two loops involve solving equations of the form x2 + y2 = M . For such
an equation to have solutions it is sufficient that M is a prime with M = 1 mod 4,
a condition that is heuristically satisfied after 2 logM random trials. Choosing S1 and
S2 as in the algorithm ensures that the right-hand term of the equation is positive, and
(assuming this term behaves like a random number of the same size) is of the desired
form for some choices (c, d), at least heuristically. Cornacchia’s algorithm runs in time
O˜(log2M), which is also O˜(log2 p) in the algorithm. The pseudo-primality tests will
require O˜(log3 p) operations in total, and their cost will dominate both loops.
Computing β2 is just linear algebra modulo N ≈ O˜(√p) and this cost can be
neglected. The last two steps can similarly be neglected.
As a result, we get an overall cost of O˜(log3 p) bit operations for the whole algo-
rithm.
Let s = 72 log p. We have n(J) = n(I
′)n(β1)n(β′2)/N
2 so neglecting log log fac-
tors log n(J) ≈ 12 log p + log p + 3 log p − log p = 72 log p. We make the heuristic






(s)s/ log s ≈ p7/2+o(1) so we can expect to find S1S2 that is s-powersmooth and of the
correct size. 
3.4 Step-by-Step Deuring Correspondence
We now discuss algorithms to convert isogeny paths into paths in the quaternion algebra,
and vice versa. This will be necessary in our protocols as we are sending curves and
isogenies, whereas the process uses the quaternion isogeny algorithm.
All the isogeny paths that we will need to translate in our signature scheme will
start from the special j-invariant j0 = 1728. We recall (see beginning of Section 3.1)
that this corresponds to the curve E0 with equation y2 = x3 + x and endomorphism
ring End(E0) := 〈1, φ, 1+piφ2 , pi+φ2 〉. Moreover there is an isomorphism of quaternion
algebras sending (1, i, j,k) to (1, φ, pi, piφ).
For any isogeny ϕ : E0 → E1 of degree n, we can associate a left End(E0)-ideal
I = Hom(E1, E0)ϕ of norm n, corresponding to a left O0-ideal with the same norm
in the quaternion algebra Bp,∞. Conversely every left O0-ideal arises in this way [25,
Section 5.3]. In our protocol we will need to make this correspondence explicit, namely
we will need to pair up each isogeny from E0 with the correct O0-ideal. Moreover we
need to do this for “large” degree isogenies to ensure a good distribution via our random
walk theorem.
Translating an ideal to an isogeny path. Let E0 and O0 = End(E0) be given, to-
gether with a left O0-ideal I corresponding to an isogeny of degree n. We assume I is
given as a Z-basis {α1, . . . , α4}. The main idea to determine the corresponding isogeny
explicitly is to determine its kernel [40].
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Assume for the moment that n is a small prime. One can compute generators for
all cyclic subgroups of E0[n], each one uniquely defining a degree n isogeny which
can be computed with Ve´lu’s formulae. A generator P then corresponds to the basis
{α1, . . . , α4} if and only if αj(P ) = 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 4. To evaluate α(P ) with α ∈ I
and P ∈ E0[n], we first write α = (u + vi + wj + xk)/2, then we compute P ′ such
that [2]P ′ = P and finally we evaluate [u]P ′ + [v]φ(P ′) + [w]pi(P ′) + [x]pi(φ(P ′)).
An alternative to trying all subgroups is to choose a pair {P1, P2} of generators for
E0[n] and, for some α ∈ I , solve the discrete logarithm instance (if possible) α(P2) =
[x]α(P1). It follows that α(P2 − [x]P1) = 0 and so we have determined a candidate
point in the kernel of the isogeny. Both solutions are too expensive for large n.
When n = `e the degree n isogeny can be decomposed into a composition of e
degree ` isogenies. If I is the corresponding leftO0-ideal of norm `e, then Ii := I mod
O0`i is a left O0-ideal of norm `i corresponding to the first i isogenies. Similarly if
P is a generator for the kernel of the degree `e isogeny then `e−i+1P is the kernel
of the degree `i isogeny corresponding to the first i steps. One can therefore perform
the matching of ideals with kernels step-by-step with successive approximations of I
or P respectively. This algorithm is more efficient than the previous one, but it still
requires to compute `e torsion points, which in general may be defined over a degree
`e extension of Fp2 . To ensure that the `e torsion is defined over Fp2 one can choose p
such that `e | (p ± 1) as in the De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt protocols; however for general p this
translation algorithm will still be too expensive.
We solve this efficiency issue by using powersmooth degree isogenies in our pro-




i with distinct primes `i, one reduces to the prime power case
as follows. For simplicity we assume that 2 does not divide n. The isogeny of de-
gree n can be decomposed into a sequence of prime degree isogenies. For simplicity
we assume the isogeny steps are always performed in increasing degree order; we can




j . Using a Chi-
nese Remainder Theorem-like representation, points in E0[n] can be represented as a
sequence of points in E0[`eii ]. If I is a left O0-ideal of norm n and ϕ is the correspond-
ing isogeny, then the kernel of I mod O0`eii is the `eii part of the kernel of ϕ, namely
ker(I mod O0`eii ) = [n/`eii ] kerϕ. Given a left O0-ideal I , Algorithm 2 progressively
identifies the corresponding isogeny sequence.
In our protocols we will have `eii = O(log n) = O(log p); moreover we will be
using O(log p) different primes. The complexity of Algorithm 2 under these assump-
tions is given by the following lemma. Note that almost all primes `i are such that√
B < `i ≤ B and so ei = 1, hence we ignore the obvious `-adic speedups that can be
obtained in the rare cases when `i is small.
Lemma 4. Let n =
∏
`eii with log n = O(log p) and `
ei
i = O(log p). Then Algo-
rithm 2 can be implemented to run in time O˜(log6 p) bit operations for the first loop,
and O˜(log4 p) for the rest of the algorithm.
PROOF: Without any assumption on p the `eii torsion points will generally be defined
over `eii degree extension fields, hence they will be of O(log
2 p) size. However the
isogenies themselves will be rational, i.e. defined over Fp2 . This means their kernel is
defined by a polynomial over Fp2 . Isogenies over Fp2 of degree d can be evaluated at
any point in Fp2 using O(d) field operations in Fp2 .
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Algorithm 2 Translating ideal to isogeny path




i with 2 - n.
Output: the isogeny corresponding to I through Deuring’s correspondence.
for i = 1, . . . , r do
Compute a basis {Pi1, Pi2} for the `eii torsion on E0
for j = 1, 2 do




for i = 1, . . . , r do
for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 do
αik = αk with its coefficients reduced modulo `
ei
i .
Write αik = (uik + viki+ wikj+ xikk)/2.










Solve ECDLP to compute Qi of order `eii such that αik(Qi) = 0 for all k
Compute φi = isogeny with kernel 〈ϕi−1(Qi)〉 (compute with Ve´lu’s formulae).
Set ϕi = φiϕi−1
Output ϕ0, φ1, . . . , φr .
Let d = `eii . To compute a basis of the d-torsion, we first factor the division polyno-
mial over Fp2 . This polynomial has degree O(d2) = O(log(p)2). Using the algorithm
in [24] this can be done in O˜(log4 p) bit operations. Since the isogenies are defined
over Fp2 , this will give factors of degree at most (d−1)/2, each one corresponding to a
cyclic subgroup. We then randomly choose some factor with a probability proportional
to its degree, and we factor it over its splitting field, until we have found a basis of
the d-torsion. After O(1) random choices we will have a basis of the d-torsion. Each
factorization costs O˜(log5 p) using the algorithm in [38], and verifying that two points
generate the d-torsion can be done with O(d) field operations. It then takes O(d) field
operations to compute generators for all kernels. As r = O(log p) we deduce that the
first loop requires O˜(log6 p) bit operations.
ComputingPijk involves Frobenius operations and multiplications by scalars bounded
by d (and so O(log log p) bits). This requires O(log p) field operations, that is a total
of O˜(log3 p) bit operations. Any cyclic subgroup of order `eii is generated by a point
Qi = aPi1 + bPi2, and the image of this point by αik is aPi1k + bPi2k. One can
determine the integers a, b by an ECDLP computation or by testing random choices.
There are roughly `eii = O(log p) subgroups, and testing each of them requires at most
O(log log p) field operations, so finding Qi requires O˜(log p) field operations. Evalu-
ating ϕi−1(Qi) requires O(log2 p) field operations. Computing the isogeny φi can be
done in O(log p) field operations using Ve´lu’s formulae. As r = O(log p) we deduce
that the second loop requires O˜(log4 p) bit operations. 
We stress that in our signature algorithm, Algorithm 2 will be run O(log p) times.
However the torsion points are independent of both the messages and the keys, so they
can be precomputed. Hence the “online” running time of Algorithm 2 is O˜(log4 p) bit
operations per execution.
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Translating an isogeny path to an ideal. Let E0, E1, . . . , Er be an isogeny path and




j . We define I0 = O0. Then for
i = 1, . . . , r we compute an element αi ∈ Ii−1 and an ideal Ii = Ii−1`eii + Ii−1αi
that corresponds to the isogeny ϕi = φi ◦ . . . ◦ φ1. (We stress that the definition of Ii
here differs from the previous subsection.) At step i, we use a basis of Ii−1 to compute
a quadratic form fi that is the norm form of the ideal Ii−1. The roots of this quadratic
form modulo `eii correspond to candidates for αi and hence Ii. Note that this correspon-
dence is not injective: a priori there will be O((`eii )
3) roots but there are only O(`eii )
corresponding ideals including the correct one. Our strategy is to pick random solutions
to the quadratic form until the maps αi and φi have the same kernels.
Algorithm 3 Translating isogeny path to ideal
Input: E0, E1, . . . , Er isogeny path, φi : Ei−1 → Ei of degree `eii .
Output: the ideal path I0, . . . , Ir corresponding to the isogeny path.
1: Let I0 = O0
2: for i = 1, . . . , r do
3: Find Qi of order `eii that generates the kernel of φi
4: Compute [β](Qi) for all β ∈ {1, i, i+j2 , 1+k2 }
5: Let {β1, β2, β3, β4} a basis of Ii−1
6: Let fi(w, x, y, z) = n(wβ1 + xβ2 + yβ3 + zβ4)
7: repeat
8: Pick a random solution to fi(w, x, y, z) = 0 mod `eii
9: Set αi = wβ1 + xβ2 + yβ3 + zβ4
10: until [αi](Qi) = 0
11: Set Ii = Ii−1`eii + Ii−1αi
12: Perform basis reduction on Ii
In our protocols we will have `eii = O(log n) = O(log p); moreover we will be us-
ing O(log p) different primes. The complexity of Algorithm 3 under these assumptions
is given by the following lemma.




i with log n = O(log p) and `
ei
i = O(log p), and assume
all the isogenies are defined over Fp2 . Then Algorithm 3 can be implemented to run in
expected time O˜(log4 p) and the output is a Z-basis with integers bounded by X such
that logX = O(log p).
PROOF: We remind that without any assumption on p the `eii torsion points will gener-
ally be defined over `eii degree extension fields, hence they will be of O(log
2 p) size.
Isogenies of degree d can be evaluated at any point using O(d) field operations.
When the degree is odd the isogeny φi is naturally given by a polynomial ψi such
that the roots of ψi correspond to the x-coordinates of affine points in kerϕi. To identify
a generator Qi we first factor ψi over Fp2 . Using the algorithm in [38] this can be done
with O˜(log3 p) bit operations. We choose a random irreducible factor with a probability
proportional to its degree, we use this polynomial to define a field extension of Fp2 , and
we check whether the corresponding point is of order `eii . If not we choose another
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irreducible factor and we repeat. We expect to only need to repeat this O(1) times, and
each step requires O˜(log p) bit operations. So the total cost for line 3 is O˜(log3 p).
Step 4 requiresO(log log p) field operations to compute a pointQ′i such that [2]Q
′
i =
Qi. After that it mostly requires O(log p) field operations to compute the Frobenius
map. The total cost of this step is therefore O˜(log3 p).
Basis elements for all the ideals Ii appearing in the algorithm can be reduced mod-
ulo O0n, hence their coefficients are of size log n = O(log p).
To compute a random solution to fi modulo `eii , we choose uniformly random val-
ues for w, x, y, and when the resulting quadratic equation in z has solutions modulo
`eii we choose a random one. As `
ei
i = O(log p) the cost of this step can be neglected.
Computing [αi](Qi) requires O(log log p) operations over a field of size O(log2 p). On
average we expect to repeat the loop O(`eii ) = O(log p) times, resulting in a total cost
of O˜(log3 p). Computing each fi costs O˜(log p) bit operations.
As r = O(log p) the total cost of the algorithm is O˜(log4 p).
One can check that all integers in the algorithm are bounded in terms of n, and so
coefficients are of size X where logX = O(log n) = O(log p). 
Recall that the condition logX = O(log p) is needed in Lemma 3.
4 Classical and Post-Quantum Signature Schemes
Digital signatures are one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives. It is well-
known that they can be built from identification protocols using the Fiat-Shamir trans-
form [15]. The resulting signatures are existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-
message attacks (the standard security definition for signatures) with respect to classical
adversaries, in the random oracle model. The transform is also secure against quantum
adversaries under certain conditions [34], however these conditions are met by neither
De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt’s protocol nor ours. In particular, soundness relies on computational
assumptions in both protocols. However, one can replace the Fiat-Shamir transform
with an alternative transform due to Unruh to achieve security against quantum adver-
saries [33].
This section explains the two signature schemes obtained from our new identifica-
tion protocol. Due to lack of space we refer to Yoo et al. [42] and the full version of the
paper [18] for the two signature schemes obtained from the De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt ID-scheme.
4.1 Classical Signature Scheme based on Endomorphism Ring Computation
In this section we fully specify the signature scheme resulting from applying a variant of
the Fiat-Shamir transform to our new identification scheme based on the endomorphism
ring computation problem, and we analyse its efficiency.
Key Generation Algorithm: On input a security parameter λ generate a prime p with 2λ
bits, which is congruent to 3 modulo 4. LetE0 : y2 = x3+Ax over Fp be supersingular,













< (p1+)−1. Perform a random
isogeny walk of degree S1 from the curve E0 with j-invariant j0 = 1728 to a curve
E1 with j-invariant j1. Compute O1 = End(E1) and the ideal I corresponding to
this isogeny. Choose a hash function H with t = 2λ bits of output. The public key is
PK = (p, j1, H) and the secret key is SK = O1, or equivalently I .
Signing Algorithm: On input a message m and keys (PK, SK), recover the parameters p
and j1. For i = 1, . . . , t, generate a random isogeny walk wi of degree S2, ending at a
j-invariant j2,i. Compute h := H(m, j2,1, . . . , j2,t) and parse the output as t challenge
bits bi. For i = 1, . . . , t, if bi = 1 use wi and Algorithm 3 of Section 3.4 to compute
the corresponding ideal Ii and hence its right order O2,i = End(E2,i), then use the
algorithm of Section 3.3 on input IIi to compute a “fresh” path between O0 and O2,i,
and finally use Algorithm 2 to compute an isogeny path w′i from j0 to j2,i. If bi = 0 set
zi := wi, otherwise set zi := w′i. Return the signature σ = (h, z1, . . . , zt).
Verification Algorithm: On input a message m, a signature σ and a public key PK,
recover the parameters p and j1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t one uses zi to compute the image
curve E2,i of the isogeny. Hence the verifier recovers the signature components j2,i for
1 ≤ i ≤ t. The verifier then recomputes the hash H(m, j2,1, . . . , j2,t) and checks that
the value is equal to h, accepting the signature if this is the case and rejecting otherwise.
We now show that this scheme is a secure signature.
Theorem 4. If Problem 6 is computationally hard then the signature scheme is secure
in the random oracle model under a chosen message attack.
PROOF: As shown in Section 3.2, if Problem 6 is computationally hard then the
identification scheme (sigma protocol) has 2-special soundness and honest verifier zero-
knowledge. Theorem 2 therefore implies that the identification scheme is secure against
impersonation under passive attacks. It follows from Abdalla et al. [1] that the signature
scheme is secure in the random oracle model. 
Efficiency: As the best classical algorithm for computing the endomorphism ring of a
supersingular elliptic curve runs in time O˜(
√
p) one can take log p = 2λ. By Theorem 1
and Lemma 1, taking B ≈ 2(1 + ) log p ensures that the outputs of random walks
are distributed uniformly enough. Random walks then require 2(1 + ) log p bits to









bits on average, depending on the challenge bits. For λ bits of security, we choose
t = 2λ, so the average signature length is approximately 2λ+ (λ)(4(1 + )λ+ 7λ) ≈
(11 + 4)λ2 ≈ 11λ2.
Private keys are 2(1 + ) log p ≈ 4λ bits if a canonical representation of the kernel
of the isogeny between E0 and E1 is stored. This can be reduced to 2λ bits for generic
23
E1: if I is the ideal corresponding to this isogeny, it is sufficient to store another ideal
J in the same class, and for generic E1 there exists one ideal of norm n ≈ √p. To rep-
resent this ideal in the most efficient way, it is sufficient to give n and a second integer
defining the localization of I at every prime factor ` of n, for canonical embeddings
of Bp,∞ into M2(Q`). This reduces storage costs to roughly 2λ bits. Public keys are
3 log p = 6λ bits. A signature mostly requires t calls to the Algorithms of Sections 3.3
and 3.4, for a total cost of O˜(λ5). Verification requires to check O(λ) isogeny walks,
each one comprising O(λ) steps with a cost O˜(λ3) each when modular polynomials
are precomputed, hence a total cost of O˜(λ5) bit operations (under the same heuristic
assumptions as in Lemma 3).
Optimization with Non Backtracking Walks: In our description of the signature scheme
we have allowed isogeny paths to “backtrack”. We made this choice to simplify the
convergence analysis of random walks and because it does not affect the asymptotic
complexity of our schemes significantly. However in practice at any concrete security
parameter, it will be better to use non-backtracking random walks as they will converge
more quickly to a uniform distribution [2].
4.2 Post-Quantum Signature Scheme based on Endomorphism Ring
Computation
We briefly describe the signature scheme arising from applying Unruh’s transform to
the identification protocol of Section 3.
Key Generation Algorithm: On input a security parameter λ generate a prime p with 4λ
bits, which is congruent to 3 modulo 4. LetE0 : y2 = x3+Ax over Fp be supersingular,
and let O0 = End(E0). Set t = 3λ. Fix B, S1, S2 as in the key generation algorithm
of Section 4.1. Perform a random isogeny walk of degree S1 from the curve E0 with
j-invariant j0 = 1728 to a curve E1 with j-invariant j1. Compute O1 = End(E1) and
the ideal I corresponding to this isogeny.
Choose a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}t. Let N ≈ 72 log p be an upper
bound for the bitlength of the representation of any isogeny path in the algorithm. Let
G : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}N be a hash function such that every element has polynomially
many preimages. The public key is PK = (p, j1, H,G) and the secret key is SK = O1,
or equivalently I .
Signing Algorithm: On input a message m and keys (PK, SK), recover the parameters
p and j1. For i = 1, . . . , t generate a random isogeny walk wi of degree S2, ending at a
j-invariant j2,i.
For i = 1, . . . , t apply Algorithm 3 of Section 3.4 to compute the ideal Ii corre-
sponding to the isogeny path wi, then use the algorithm of Section 3.3 on input IIi to
compute a “fresh” ideal corresponding to a path between O0 and O2,i, and finally use
Algorithm 2 to compute an isogeny path w′i from j0 to j2,i.
Compute gi,0 = G(wi) and gi,1 = G(w′i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where the bitstrings wi
and w′i are padded with zeroes to become binary strings of length N . Compute h :=
H(m, j1, j2,1, . . . , j2,t, g1,0, g1,1, . . . , gt,0, gt,1) and parse the output as t challenge bits
24
hi. For i = 1, . . . , t, if hi = 0 then set RSPi = wi and if hi = 1 then set RSPi = w′i.
Return the signature σ = (h, RSP1, . . . , RSPt, g1,1−h1 , . . . , gt,1−ht).
Verification Algorithm: On input a message m, a signature σ and a public key PK,
recover the parameters p and j1.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t one uses RSPi to compute the image curve E2,i of the isogeny
(if hi = 0 then RSPi is a path from E1 and if hi = 1 then it is a path from E0). Hence
the verifier recovers the j-invariants j2,i for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
The verifier then computes gi,hi = G(RSPi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t (again padding to N bits
using zeros). Finally the verifier computes the hash value
h′ = H(m, j1, j2,1, . . . , j2,t, g1,0, g1,1, . . . , gt,0, gt,1).
If h′ = h then the verifier accepts the signature and otherwise rejects.
We now show that this scheme is a secure signature.
Theorem 5. If Problem 6 is computationally hard then the signature scheme is secure
in the quantum random oracle model under a chosen message attack.
PROOF: As shown in Section 3.2, if Problem 6 is computationally hard then the
identification scheme (sigma protocol) has 2-special soundness and honest verifier zero-
knowledge. A result of Unruh [33] then implies that the signature scheme is secure in
the quantum random oracle model. 
Efficiency: For the same reasons as in the application of the Unruh transform applied
to the De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt scheme, this signature scheme is less efficient than its classical
counterpart. Again, we only send half the values gi,j , since the missing values can be
recomputed by the signer.
The average signature size is t + t((logS1 + N)/2) + tN , on the basis that half
the responses RSPi can be represented using logS1 bits and half of them require N
bits. For λ bits of security, we choose log p = 4λ and t = 3λ, so that N = 14λ and
logS1 = (8 + )λ. Then the average signature size is approximately 75λ2.
4.3 Comparison
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the main efficiency features of four signature schemes based
either on De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt or on our new identification scheme, and on Fiat-Shamir or
Unruh transforms. The numbers provided were obtained by optimizing signature sizes
first, then signing and verification time and finally key sizes; other trade-offs are of
course possible. The scheme based on the De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt identification protocol and
Unruh transform was discovered independently in [42]; the version we give incorpo-
rates optimizations that reduce the signature sizes for the same security guarantees12.
12 Both signature sizes depend linearly on a parameter t which we fixed in a more conservative
manner than Yoo et al. (see the full version of the paper for a discussion on this choice). With
t = 2λ their signatures are 69λ2 bits and ours are 48λ2 bits, and with t = 3λ their signatures
are d103.5λ2e bits and ours are 72λ2 bits. Tables 1 and 2 report values for t = 3λ.
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Signatures based on De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt identification protocol are simpler and somewhat
more efficient than signatures based on our new identification protocol; however the
latter have the advantage to rely on more standard and potentially harder computa-
tional problems. Schemes based on the Fiat-Shamir transform are more efficient than
schemes based on Unruh’s transform; however the latter provide security guarantees
against quantum adversaries.
Table 1. Asymptotic efficiency of four signature schemes using De Feo-Jao-Pluˆt and our identi-
fication protocol, and Fiat-Shamir and Unruh transform, as a function of the security parameter
λ. All sizes are in bits and computation costs are in bit operations.
Private Key Size Public Key Size Signature Size Signing Costs Verification Costs
DFJP + FS 2λ 28λ 12λ2 O˜(λ3) O˜(λ3)
Sec 3 + FS 2λ 6λ 11λ2 O˜(λ5) O˜(λ5)
DFJP + U 3λ 42λ 72λ2 O˜(λ3) O˜(λ3)
Sec 3 + U 4λ 12λ 75λ2 O˜(λ5) O˜(λ5)
Table 2. Concrete efficiency of our signature schemes at security levels of 128 and 256 bits.
Security level provided are against classical or quantum adversaries for schemes based on the
Fiat-Shamir or Unruh transforms respectively. All sizes are in bits.
128 bit 256 bit
Private Key Public Key Signature Private Key Public Key Signature
DFJP + FS 256 3584 196608 512 7168 786432
Sec 3 + FS 256 768 180224 512 1536 720896
DFJP + U 384 5376 1179648 768 10752 4718592
Sec 3 + U 512 1536 1228800 1024 3072 4915200
Table 1 and a quick comparison with RSA signatures suggest that isogeny-based
signatures schemes may be efficiency enough for practical use. Indeed for RSA signa-
tures, key sizes are cubic in the security parameter, and signing and verification times
are respectively quasi-quadratic and quasi-linear in the key sizes (the latter assuming
a small public key exponent is used), amounting to O˜(λ3) and O˜(λ6). As for concrete
parameters, key sizes are much smaller for isogeny-based signatures than for RSA sig-
natures and comparable to ECDSA signatures. Further work in this area should aim at
decreasing signature sizes.
5 Conclusion
We provided both a new identification protocol and new signature schemes based on
isogeny problems. While the only previous identification protocol based on isogeny
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problems relied on special and potentially easier variants of these problems [14], our
protocol is based on what is arguably the hardest problem in this area, namely the en-
domorphism ring computation problem. A crucial ingredient for our protocol is the
quaternion isogeny algorithm of Kohel-Lauter-Petit-Tignol [26] in the powersmooth
case, for which we provide a more complete description and analysis. The signature
schemes are derived using the Fiat-Shamir and Unruh transforms, respectively for clas-
sical and post-quantum security. We showed that they can have very small key sizes and
reasonably efficient signing and verification algorithms compared to RSA signatures.
Isogeny problems are interesting in cryptography for their potential resistance to
quantum algorithms, but they are also rather new in cryptography. Among all isogeny
problems, the problem of computing the endomorphism ring of a supersingular elliptic
curve is the most natural one to consider from an algorithmic number theory point of
view, and it has in fact been studied since Kohel’s PhD thesis in 1996. Yet, even this
problem is far from having received the same scrutiny as more established cryptography
problems like discrete logarithms or integer factoring. We hope that this paper will
encourage the community to study its complexity.
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A Efficient Representations of Isogeny Paths and Other Data
Our schemes require representing/transmitting elliptic curves and isogenies. In this sec-
tion we briefly explain how to represent certain mathematical objects appearing in our
protocol as bitstrings in a canonical way so that minimal data needs to be sent and
stored.
Let p be a prime number. Every supersingular j-invariant is defined over Fp2 . A
canonical representation of Fp2 -elements is obtained via a canonical choice of de-
gree 2 irreducible polynomial over Fp. Canonical representations in any other extension
fields are defined in a similar way. Although there are only about p/12 supersingular
j-invariants in characteristic p, we are not aware of an efficient method to encode these
invariants into log p bits, so we represent supersingular j-invariants with the 2 log p bits
it takes to represent an arbitrary Fp2 -element.
Elliptic curves are defined by their j-invariant up to isomorphism. Hence, rather
than sending the coefficients of the elliptic curve equation, it suffices to send the j-
invariant. For any invariant j there is a canonical elliptic curve equation Ej : y2 =
x3 + 3j1728−jx+
2j
1728−j when j 6= 0, 1728, y2 = x3 + 1 when j = 0, and y2 = x3 + x
when j = 1728. The last one is used in our main signature scheme.
We now turn to representing chains E0, E1, . . . , En of isogenies φi : Ei−1 → Ei
each of prime degree `i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Here `i are always very small primes. A
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useful feature of our protocols is that isogeny chains can always be chosen such that the
isogeny degrees are increasing `i ≥ `i−1. First we need to discuss how to represent the
sequence of isogeny degrees. If all degrees are equal to a fixed constant ` (e.g., ` = 2)
and if the length n is a fixed system parameter, then there is nothing to send. If the






The receiver can recover the sequence of isogeny degrees from N by factoring using
trial division and ordering the primes by size. This representation is possible due to our
convention that the isogeny degrees are increasing and since the degrees are all small.
To represent the curves themselves in the chain of isogenies the simplest method
is to send all the j-invariants ji = j(Ei) ∈ Fp2 for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. This requires 2(n +
1) log2(p) bits. Note that the verifier is able to check the correctness of the isogeny chain
by checking that Φ`i(ji−1, ji) = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where Φ`i is the `i-th modular
polynomial. The advantage of this method is that verification is relatively quick (just
evaluating a polynomial that can be precomputed and stored).
The other naive method is to send the x-coordinate of a kernel point Pi ∈ Eji on
the canonical curve. This requires large bandwidth.
A refinement of the second method is used in our signature scheme based on the De
Feo-Jao-Pluˆt identification protocol, where ` is fixed and one can publish a point that
defines the kernel of the entire isogeny chain. Precisely a curve E and points R,S ∈
E[`n] are fixed. Each integer 0 ≤ α < `n defines a subgroup 〈R+ [α]S〉 and hence an
`n isogeny. It suffices to send α, which requires log2(`
n) bits. In the case ` = 2 this is
just n bits, which is smaller than all the other suggestions in this section.
The full version of the paper contains a more thorough discussion of optimisations
and also an analysis of the complexity of computing isogeny chains.
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